Dissertation

 

The Proliferation of State and Local Elections in the United States, 1776-1900

In my book-style dissertation, I address the puzzle of American electoral exceptionalism - why does the U.S. fill so many government offices by direct election?

Circa 1787, Americans elected very few state and local officials.  Yet, by the 20th century they elected far more politicians than any other country. This feature is at the heart of our modern political system, but we know little about its origins and development. In this dissertation, I present original data and a theoretical framework for thinking about "electoralization" -- the process by which state governments expanded the number of elected offices at the state and county levels -- in the century after Independence.

 

I present a model of a bargaining problem, faced by all governments, in which leaders must simultaneously fill public offices and fully fund the government's budget. Applying the model to the early American states, I argue that the growth of elective offices stemmed from political elites' fears that suffrage expansion would threaten their control of unitary executive power. To marshal evidence for my theory, I pair a novel dataset on electoralization from 1776 to 1900 with a difference-in-difference approach, taking advantage of the states' asynchronous timing of suffrage expansion to estimate the effect of Universal Male Suffrage on the number of elected offices.

Papers in Progress

"Ideal point estimates for nonvoting delegates: Evidence from votes in Committee of the Whole"

"Would Statehood for D.C. and Puerto Rico Change Congress? A Counterfactual Analysis"

Other Research

"Metal By Numbers: Revisiting the Uneven Distribution of Heavy Metal Music" (2018). Metal Music Studies, Vol. 4:3, pp. 559-571. (Replication code and data available here)

"Balancing Inflation and Unemployment: Text Analysis of Annual Monetary Policy Reports'' (2013), Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Vol. 13:1, pp. 1-16.

[Cited in Cornell Law Review, Nov. 2016]

© 2020 by Cameron DeHart